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ABSTRACT 
 
Tax Evasion and Social Interactions∗ 
 
The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In 
Manski’s (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., 
endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects 
(i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must 
decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those 
faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The 
estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social 
equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and 
Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is 
sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are 
consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects. 
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1 Introduction
In the standard model of tax evasion first proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Yitzhaki (1974), the taxpayer is treated as an isolated expected utility maximizer who makes a
portfolio decision under uncertainty. Cheating on taxes boils down to a simple game with the
tax authority whose payoff is either a lower tax burden or, with a given probability, a larger
penalty. This theoretical framework assumes that the taxpayer is completely individualistic
and amoral. His willingness to underreport income is not affected by social norms nor by
any form of social interactions. Consequently, predicting the effects of tax or fraud preven-
tion policies can be seriously mislead if social interactions do indeed play a significant role
in tax evasion behavior. Thus as is well known since Schelling (1978) and Akerlof (1980),
interdependent behavior may generate multiple equilibria and exhibit contagion and epidemic
features through a “social multiplier effect” [see Glaeser et al. (2003) for a more recent dis-
cussion].
There are many reasons to believe that individual tax evasion decisions are affected by
social norms and social interactions (e.g., Andreoni et al. 1998). First, Erard and Feinstein
(1994) insist on the role of guilt and shame in tax compliance behavior. Likewise, Gordon
(1989) and Myles and Naylor (1996) argue that an individual can derive a psychic payoff
from adhering to the standard pattern of reporting behavior in his reference group (social
conformity effect). Second, through learning from his peers, a taxpayer may find less costly
ways to underreport income, to lower the risk of being caught or to reduce penalties associated
with tax audits (social learning effect). Finally, the individual’s perception of the fairness of
his tax burden may influence his tax evasion decisions. Indeed, Spicer and Becker (1980) have
provided evidence that those who believe they are treated unfairly by the tax system are more
likely to evade taxes to restore equity (fairness effect).
While most economists probably agree with this taxonomy, there is certainly no consensus
as to the magnitude of social interaction effects. Indeed, the very existence of these effects has
become a controversial area of research in economics. Measuring social interactions effects
raises difficult identification problems (Manski 1993) and they can be hard to estimate when
they are identifiable (Moffitt 2001). Yet, even when appropriate data and econometric methods
are used, they often turn out to be small or negligible determinants of individual outcomes
(e.g., Spicer and Hero 1985, Evans, et al. 1992, Aaronson 1998, Krauth 2002).
The identification problem arises from the fact that interdependent behavior takes differ-
ent forms that are difficult to isolate. In Manski’s (1993) terminology, the propensity of an
individual to evade may genuinely vary according to the behavior of the group (endogenous
interactions such as social conformity and social learning effects), but it may also vary with
the exogenous characteristics of the group members (exogenous interactions such as fairness
effects). Further, correlated tax evasion outcomes need not arise from interdependent behav-
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ior alone. Indeed, members of a given group may behave similarly because they have similar
unobserved characteristics or face similar institutional environments (correlated effects).
In a simple linear-in-means regression-like model, Manski (1993) has shown that equilib-
rium outcomes cannot distinguish endogenous effects from exogenous effects or correlated
effects. In this context, it is impossible to identify the true nature of social interactions. This
so-called “reflexion problem” arises because the average behavior of the group is itself the mir-
ror of the behavior of individual members of the group. A number of researchers (e.g., Brock
and Durlauf 2001b, Moffitt 2001) have analyzed alternative models that allow for identifica-
tion (e.g., nonlinearity of the mean endogenous group effect on individual behavior, exclusion
restrictions on exogenous interaction variables, randomized group composition). However,
the validity of these models rests on the credibility of the identifying assumptions imposed to
the model which in turn may depend on the nature of the data used to estimate the model.
Even when an interactions-based model is identified, its estimation raises serious econo-
metric problems. In particular, the mean group decision, which appears as a regressor, is likely
to be endogenous for two reasons. First, since individuals self-select within groups, they are
likely to face common shocks and their unobserved characteristics are likely to be highly cor-
related (sorting bias). Second, because individual and group behavior feed on one another, the
two variables are potentially simultaneously determined, at least when the groups are small
(simultaneity bias).
Several studies that correct for the sorting bias show that the endogenous interaction ef-
fects shrinks and sometimes completely disappear. For example, based on micro-simulation
estimation, Krauth (2002) has found that the actual peer effect on teen smoking is halved when
compared to standard estimation procedures. This result suggests that papers reporting impor-
tant peer effects should be taken cautiously if they ignore potential selection effects. Krauth
has also shown that the simultaneity bias may be important in small groups. Therefore the use
of appropriate data and econometric models is required to provide a robust test of the existence
of social interactions effects.
In this paper we analyze the impact of social interactions on tax evasion using experimental
data. Our approach allows to take into account the reflexion problem as well as the sorting and
the simultaneity problems. Moreover, we provide a test for the existence of multiple equilibria.
Experimental data have many advantages over alternative sources of information such as
audited tax returns or randomized surveys. While the most reliable information on noncom-
pliance is based on audited tax returns,1 they usually do not provide information on social
interaction variables nor do they reveal the nature of the reference group (or the “neighbor-
hood”) within which an individual may interact. This information is required to estimate
1See Clotfelter (1983) for an early econometric study using data on audits. He used information from the
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
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social conformity effects (Manski 2000). Also, though random surveys can provide subjective
information on the taxpayer’s reference group (e.g., Sheffrin and Triest 1992), a substantial
fraction of tax evasion activities are likely to be underreported in these data (Elffers et al.
1987). Moreover tax evaders may overestimate the amount unreported by their peer group in
order to better justify their own behavior (cognitive dissonance bias).
In contrast to these sources of information, experimental data allow to control the refer-
ence group with whom individuals interact in the laboratory. Moreover, group size can be
determined exogenously and membership assigned randomly. In this ideal setting, it may be
possible to identify the endogenous social interactions at least as long as there is a unique
social equilibrium (Moffitt 2001).2 In addition to helping solve the identification problem,
experiments are also useful in circumventing additional problems that are intrinsic to audit
and survey data. For instance the probability of auditing is generally related to the extent of
underreporting. Any analysis that uses either audit or survey data would have to control for
a potential simultaneity bias. The audit probability can be randomly assigned and unrelated
to the intensity of evasion, thus avoiding the problem. In addition, the use of a computerized
device avoids measurement errors likely to distort field data since individual decisions in the
laboratory are perfectly scored. Also, experiments enable to hold the tax reporting institution
constant and to test in a limited period of time and for a limited cost the impact of various tax
regimes and audit policies. The main shortcoming of laboratory experiments is their limited
ability to replicate the moral, emotional and social dimensions of tax compliance decisions
(Andreoni et al.1998). Consequently, experimental results may lack external validity. On the
positive side, laboratory experiments have unearthed the importance of morale in topics such
as employer-employee relationships and the importance of emotions such as reciprocity or
inequality aversion in bargaining games.
Few attempts have been made to document the impact of social interactions on tax com-
pliance using experimental data. What little evidence exists is rather inconclusive. Recent
attempts have focused on criminal activities such as stealing (Falk and Fischbacher 2002) or
free riding in public goods games (Falk et al. 2002), but none has focused on tax compliance
per se. One notable exception is Bosco and Mittone (1997). In their setting, individuals re-
ceive a public good commensurate to the tax contributions of all group members. They found
strong evidence that the individual compliance is influenced by the reporting behavior of other
group members. In our setup, contrary to most experimental studies, individual money payoffs
do not depend on the other participants’ behavior. This allows us to better isolate the effect of
social interactions. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze the reflexion and the
endogeneity problems using experimental data.
2In practice however, random assignment may not wash away entirely correlated effects since participants are
usually drawn from a restricted pool of volunteers who are likely to have similar unobserved characteristics (e.g.,
students from a business school and from engineering schools, as in our experiment).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a theoretical model
of tax evasion with both endogenous and exogenous social interactions. Our model extends
the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model by allowing for social conformity and fair-
ness effects. Since in this game (and in the experimental setup as well) agents share the same
information, we do not consider social learning.3 Section 3 describes the tax evasion experi-
ment we have designed in order to estimate and test our theoretical model. Section 4 discusses
our econometric approach. Our model is estimated using a two-limit simultaneous tobit with
fixed group effects. We show that a unique social equilibrium exists when so called ”co-
herency conditions” (Gourie´roux et al. 1980) are satisfied. Also, our results suggest that the
intrinsic nonlinearities of the tobit model ease the identification of the endogenous interactions
effects. It turns out that the model is identified even when participants in various groups are
not chosen randomly and without assuming any exclusion restrictions on exogenous interac-
tions variables. In a sense, our approach extends Brock and Durlauf’s (2001a) discrete choice
model to the case where the censored choice variable is a mix of discrete and continuous vari-
ables. Our simultaneous tobit takes into account both sorting and simultaneity biases. Section
5 contains some descriptive statistics about the experiment and discusses the econometric re-
sults. According to our findings, equilibrium outcomes are consistent with (anti-)conformity
effects when endogeneity is not accounted for. But when it is, they are no longer statistically
significant. Our results also confirm the presence of fairness effects in terms of horizontal
equity but reject correlated effects. Moreover, the individual tax rate, the probability of au-
dit, gender and inegality aversion all have a significant influence on tax compliance behavior.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Model of Tax Evasion with Social Interactions
2.1 Modelling the individual tax evasion decision
In this section we introduce endogenous and exogenous social interactions among taxpayers
into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki tax evasion model. Consider individual i who
belongs to a reference group of size N , N being exogenous. His decision horizon is one
period. His before-tax income I , normalized to 1, is unknown to the tax authority and is
exogenous. For simplicity, assume all individuals in the group have the same income. The
individual faces a flat tax rate ti on his reported income, Di. He must decide how much
income to report knowing that with probability pi his tax return will be audited. If caught
cheating he must pay the amount of evaded tax, tiFi, with Fi = 1−Di, plus a commensurate
penalty θtiFi, with θ > 0. For simplicity, the penalty rate is assumed the same for everyone.
3We nevertheless present a simple test for dynamic social learning and reject it strongly. See section 5.
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If the individual is not audited, his net income will be 1− tiDi. If he is audited his net income
will be 1−tiDi−(1+θ)tiFi = 1−tiDi−(1+θ)ti(I−Di). Expected utility, EUi, is assumed
to consist of two separable components:
EUi = {(1− pi)u(1− tiDi) + piu(1− tiDi − (1 + θ)ti(1−Di))}+ S(Di, Xi). (1)
The first component between braces is the private expected utility associated with tax compli-
ance behavior, that is, with a choice of Di. Assuming that the individual is risk averse, private
utility u(·) is increasing and concave in consumption. The second component, S(Di, Xi), is
the social (ex-ante) utility associated with tax compliance. This component is assumed to de-
pend on reported income, Di, and on a vector Xi of exogenous variables to be defined below.4
The marginal social utility of tax compliance, si ≡ ∂S/∂Di, is assumed to depend only on
Xi : si = s(Xi). Therefore S(Di, Xi) is an affine function of Di and can be written as:
S(Di, Xi) = s(Xi)Di. (2)
= s(D
e
−i, ti − t−i, pi − p−i, Ai, A−i, εi)Di. (3)
The vector Xi includes a number of variables. First, we assume that the marginal social utility
of tax compliance depends on De−i, individual i’s subjective expectation of the average tax
compliance of the other members of his reference group. A positive effect corresponds to a
social conformity effect.5 In that case, preferences exhibit so-called strategic complementar-
ities (Brock and Durlauf 2001a). A negative effect corresponds to a social anti-conformity
effect (strategic substitutabilities). In that case the individual prefers to deviate from the tax
compliance behavior of his reference group. Second, given that participants receive the same
before-tax income, the marginal social utility is assumed to be decreasing with the difference
between individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities, ti−t−i and pi−p−i, respectively
(fairness effects). Finally, Xi includes a sub-vector Ai of observable attributes (e.g., gender),
a sub-vector A−i of the corresponding average observable attributes of the other members
and a random term ²i that captures unobservable individual-specific attributes and attributes
that are common to all individuals in the group.6 The theoretical model and its econometric
counterpart are linked through the error term εi.
We assume that the public goods funded by the tax do not enter the individual’s utility and
therefore have no bearing on tax evasion decisions. Substituting equations (3) and (2) into (1)
and assuming that preferences satisfy the Von Neuman-Morgenstern axioms, the individual’s
4The separability assumption between private and social utilities is relatively common. See Brock and Durlauf
(2001a).
5Myles and Naylor (1996) assume that the conformity effect is limited to the evasion decision. In our more
general approach, the evaded amount (not only the evasion decision) can be influenced by the behavior of other
agents (see Gordon 1989).
6The vectors A and A−i and the scalar εi could also influence the private utility component of the individual’s
expected utility. However this would not change the comparative statics of the model in any significant way.
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problem is to choose how much income to report, Di, so as to maximize his expected utility
(1) subject to the inequality conditions 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1.
The optimal level of reported income can be derived from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Instead, we present an equivalent formulation that is more in line with our econometric spec-
ification. Let us first solve the optimization problem while ignoring the inequality conditions
on Di. The equation for D∗i , the latent variable associated with Di, can be written as:
D∗i = D
∗(ti, pi, D
e
−i, ti − t−i, pi − p−i, Ai, A−i, εi). (4)
Because the individual’s income and penalty rate θ are assumed constant they are omitted from
(4). Given the inequality conditions on Di , the relationship between the (observed) variable
Di and the latent (unobserved) variable D∗i is given by:
Di = 1I (0 < D
∗
i < 1 )D
∗
i + 1I (D
∗
i ≥ 1 ), (5)
where 1I (a) is an indicator function for the event a.
From this model we can derive six predictions regarding tax evasion:
1. A risk-averse individual will always underreport his income (i.e., Di < 1) whenever
1− s(Xi)/tu′(1− t)− pi(1 + θ) > 0, that is, whenever the expected return on evaded
taxes is strictly positive, with due allowance for the marginal social cost of tax evasion,
s(Xi)/tu
′(1− t). Interestingly, simple expected utility models predict much lower com-
pliance rates than what is usually observed in practice (see Andreoni et al. 1998). The
difference may be partly attributable to the omission of this marginal social cost.
The next five predictions concern the impact of exogenous variables on the amount re-
ported by individual i assuming an interior solution:
1.
3. ∂Di/∂ti =?, assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion;
4. ∂Di/∂pi ≥ 0;
5. ∂Di/∂D
e
−i =?;
6. ∂Di/∂(ti − t−i) ≤ 0 ;
7. ∂Di/∂(pi − p−i) ≤ 0.
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Proposition (2) states that the impact of an increase in the tax rate on tax compliance can
be positive or negative. The impact can be decomposed into two components of opposite sign.
The first is positive (see Yitzhaki 1974) and has raised a lot of discussion in the literature since
it is rather counter-intuitive. It arises because the penalty is proportional to the amount of
evaded tax. Therefore an increase in the tax rate involves no substitution effect between the
individual’s private consumption when he is audited and when he is not. Because it reduces
income, however, the individual is induced to cheat less if his absolute risk aversion decreases
with income. The second effect derives from the social component in the individual’s utility.
Because the marginal cost (in terms of paid taxes) of tax compliance increases with the tax rate,
the individual reduces his level of tax compliance. Therefore, our model shows that adding
a social conformity component to the individual’s utility function may generate a positive
relationship between tax rates and tax evasion.
Proposition (3) was first derived by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and states that an in-
crease in the audit probability increases tax compliance. Proposition (4) states that an increase
in the average amount of reported income by the reference group may increase tax compli-
ance (social conformity effect) or decrease it (anti-conformity effect). Finally, propositions
(5) and (6) indicate that an increase in the difference between an individual’s tax rate and that
of his group and in the difference between the individual’s audit probability rate and that of
the group reduces tax compliance (fairness effects). Propositions (4)–(6) derive from the fact
that an increase in the marginal social utility of tax compliance, si, induces the individual to
report more income to the tax authority.
2.2 Social equilibrium with tax evasion
We assume that the individual acts non-cooperatively and does not take into account the effect
of his decision on the choices made by the other members of his group. In order words,
he makes his tax compliance decision conditional upon his expectations about their average
reported income, De−i. To close the model, we must state explicitly how individuals form
their expectations and in particular how they relate to the information available at the time the
decision is made. This issue is crucial because the estimates of the social conformity effect
are intimately related to the expectations formation mechanism.
Instead of relying on an ad hoc mechanism ( e.g., myopic, adaptative), we have chosen
the following approach in our experiment. Each group plays five separate interactive rounds.
At the beginning of each round, tax rates and audit probabilities are randomly assigned to
group members and remain constant for the duration of the round. Each round is broken-
down into periods. At the end of each period, once every group member has recorded his
decision, D−i is computed and reported to each member i. The game is repeated a sufficient
number of periods to insure convergence is reached. The convergence criterion is expressed as
7
∣∣∣(Dt−1 −Dt−2)/Dt−2∣∣∣ ≤ .05.7 If there exists a social equilibrium, it follows that De−i ' D−i
which is a property of the (Nash) social equilibrium.8 This approach allows us to assume
self-consistent beliefs in our estimations.
The equilibrium condition of the model is thus obtained by setting De−i = D−i and replac-
ing D−i by 1N−1(DN −Di) in the latent equation (4). Substituting this equation into (5) and
solving for Di as a function of D and xi, we get Di = D(D, xi). Adding over N and dividing
by N we finally get:
D =
N∑
i=1
Di(D, xi)
N
= G(D, x), (6)
where x is the vector of all exogenous individual and policy variables of the model. Since
G(D, x) is continuous and the support of D is compact, it follows from Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem that there must exist at least one solution for D that satisfies this condition. As argued
by Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b) multiple equilibria are a
common feature of interactions-based models such as (6). We will take up this issue in Section
4 and we will show that it is related to the coherency conditions of the model to be estimated.
3 Experimental design
The purpose of our experiment is to generate data to estimate and test our model of tax eva-
sion with endogenous and exogenous social interactions. Our experiment comprises two parts
(see instructions in Appendix A). The first part of the experiment consists of 5 rounds and ex-
cludes endogenous social interactions because information on group behavior is not disclosed
(“NOINFO” treatment). Each group is composed of 15 participants. At the beginning of each
round, each participant receives the same initial exogenous “endowment” of 100 experimental
currency units (ECU) which constitutes his income. He is requested to give back a percentage
of his income (a “deduction rate”). There are 5 different tax rates, with each rate randomly
assigned to 3 participants. This is common knowledge. Each participant is told that these
paybacks will go into scientific research funds (i.e., the lab gets this amount of money back).
To satisfy this request, the participant must report an amount between 0 and 100 that will be
partly taxed back. He is informed that his reported income can be audited according to a cer-
tain probability and that this audit will entail the payment of a fine (a “penalty”) if the reported
7Obviously the convergence criterion can only be computed after two periods. After ten iterations, the round
is stopped if no convergence has been reached and the round is discarded. See Section 3.
8If there is a new realization of the random term εi at each period (εi becomes εit) and individuals do not
communicate, the perfect foresight equilibrium is replaced by a rational expectations equilibrium which implies:
D
e
−i = E(D−i).
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income is less than his endowment. The penalty is fixed at 100% of unpaid taxes. There are
5 audit probabilities, with each audit probability randomly assigned to 3 participants. This
is also common knowledge. The participants are informed that the probabilities are indepen-
dent of the reported amounts. It should be noted that the distribution of individual tax rates is
independent of the distribution of the audit probabilities.
To simplify decision-making, a scrollbar on the computer screen indicates for each possi-
ble value of reported income the payoffs if not audited and if caught cheating. At the end of
each round, once all participants have validated their decision on the keyboard, a new round
starts automatically. There is no feed-back about actual audits and payoffs before the whole
session is completed. This limits the presence of wealth effects during the experiment that
may distort compliance behavior. At the beginning of each new round a new series of tax
rates and audit probabilities are reassigned to the group members. We deliberately alternate
between medium, low and high tax and audit regimes to limit the probability of successive
bad draws.
The second part of the experiment also consists of 5 rounds. It corresponds to the so-
called information condition (“INFO” treatment). Two main changes are introduced in the
protocol. The first change relates to the structure of the rounds. The second to the informa-
tional feedback. Each round now includes up to 10 periods. The idea is to allow convergence
in decision making to reach social equilibrium. In the first period of a new round, new tax and
audit regimes are assigned for the whole round. From the second period on, each participant
receives a feedback about the group behavior in the previous period. Hence, the number of
evaders among the 14 other group members and their mean reported income appear on the
screen. During a round, individual tax rates and audit probabilities are fixed. A new period
is launched until the convergence criteria is equal to or lower than 5% in absolute value. All
the other parameters of the protocol remain unchanged during a round. If convergence is not
achieved within 10 periods, a new round is initiated.
By combining various tax rates and audit probabilities the experiment mimics a large range
of tax regimes (see Appendix B). A total of 12 sessions were carried out, each involving 10
rounds. The sessions were subdivided into 3 sets. For each one, 3 different tax and audit
regimes (high, medium, low) were combined differently. In all, we thus experimented with 9
tax regimes and 9 audit regimes, yielding as many as 45 individual tax and audit rates.
At the end of their session, participants were asked to fill an anonymous post-experimental
questionnaire. This questionnaire aimed at collecting information about individual character-
istics such as age, gender, college major, number of completed years of university or college,
personal income, and each parent’s monthly income. An additional item was added to elicit
the individual degree of inegality aversion. Participants had to imagine a situation involving
the share of a pie among two persons (excluding themselves in order to get less emotional de-
cision). They were asked to indicate their favorite share among two possibilities. They had to
9
make three consecutive choices. The alternative shares were (50, 50) against (55, 65), (50, 50)
against (45, 70), and (50, 50) against (35, 85). Rejection of a greater pie but more unequally
shared can be considered a signal of a high inequality aversion. An index of inequality aver-
sion (between 0 and 2) is included in some specifications of the model as a control variable.9
This experiment was performed at GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de The´orie Economique,
France) using the Regate software. Participants were volunteer undergraduate and graduate
students from four business and engineer schools and university ( ´Ecole Centrale, ´Ecole de
Management, ITECH, department of economics of the University of Lyon). Recruitement
was made through posters and leaflets distributed in various classes. Registration was made
either by email or by phone.
A total of 180 students participated in this experiment. Since each session consisted of 10
rounds, this provides a total of 1800 observations (900 for each of NOINFO and INFO treat-
ment). Excluding rounds which did not achieve convergence leaves a total of 795 observations
for the INFO treatment.
At the end of the session the average score computed over all ten rounds was converted at
a rate of 100 ECU = 15 e. Participants were paid in cash in a separate room. A show-up fee of
3 e was added to cover participation expenses and participants who answered the questions
on inequality aversion received an additional 1.5 e. The average earning was 13.77 e.
4 Econometric model
In this section we discuss the econometric methodology used to estimate the model. Since it
takes into consideration both exogenous and endogenous interactions, we focus exclusively
on data from the second part of the experiment with feedback information. To simplify our
task, a linear version of the latent equation (4) is assumed. The latter is rewritten as:
Dg∗ik = x
g
ikβ + γD
g
−ik + x
g
−ikδ + c
g + ηgik, (7)
where Dg∗ik is a latent variable for the desired amount of income reported by individual i in
group g at round k, i = 1, ..., N, g = 1, ...G, k = 1...K; xgik is a corresponding row vec-
tor of observable exogenous variables (including a constant term), β and δ are vectors of
parameters, cg represents unobservable group-specific attributes and ηgik is an error term cap-
turing the effects of unobservable individual-specific attributes that may vary across rounds
9The index, F , is constructed as followed. We first define three dummies Vi(i = 1, 2, 3) associated the three
consecutive choices above, with Vi = 1 when the choice is (50, 50). We let F = 0 when V1 = 0, V2 = 0 and
V3 = 0 or when V1 = 0, V2 = 0 and V3 = 1 (low aversion), F = 2 when V1 = 1, V2 = 1 and V3 = 1 or when
V1 = 0, V2 = 1 and V3 = 1 (high aversion), and F = 1 in all other cases (average aversion).
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ηgik ∼ N(0, σ2). In addition, let
D
g
−ik =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
Dgjk, x
g
−ik =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
xgjk.
In this model γ is the endogenous social interaction effect. If positive, participants conform
to group behavior, while if negative, they deviate from the group behavior. The vector δ
captures the exogenous effects (including the fairness effect). To model the correlated effects
two approaches can be used. The group random effects approach treats cg as a random term
assuming it is orthogonal to the exogenous variables: ²gik = cg + η
g
ik. The group fixed effects
approach allows cg to be arbitrarily correlated with the exogenous variables. This method
is more general and in fact much easier to implement than the former approach. We follow
Aransson et al. (1999) and use the group fixed effects approach. There are thus G− 1 dummy
variables to be estimated, one for each group, save one to allow identification. Correlated
effects can be investigated by testing whether the G− 1 parameter estimates are jointly equal
to zero.
Following Kooreman (2003), the N equations in (7) corresponding to those associated
with round k of session g can be written in matrix notation as
Dg∗k = X
g
kβ + ΓD
g
k +X
g
−kδ + C
gdgιN + η
g
k, for g = 1, · · · , G; k = 1, · · · , K, (8)
where
Γ =

0 γ
N−1 · · · γN−1
γ
N−1 0 · · · γN−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
γ
N−1
γ
N−1 · · · 0
 ,
Cg is a (G − 1) row vector of group-specific fixed effects, dg is a (G − 1) column vector of
dummy variables and ιN is a N × 1 column vector of ones. Recall that the reported income is
normalized between 0 and 1. The relationship between the observed vector Dgk of reported in-
comes and the corresponding latent vector is given byDgk = 1I (0 < D
g∗
i < 1 )D
g∗
i + 1I (D
g∗
i ≥ 1 ),
where as before 1I (·) is a vector of indicator functions which take the value one or zero. Equa-
tion (8) corresponds to a simultaneous equation two-limit tobit with within- and cross-equation
restrictions on parameters (see matrix Γ) and with error terms uncorrelated across equations.
It involves both latent variables and their observed counterparts. Amemyia (1974) was the
first to consider such mixed models and the approach we use to estimate our system is based
on his work.
The estimation of (8) raises two distinct problems that must be addressed separately: the
so-called coherency problem and the identification problem. The coherency problem (see
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Gourie´roux et al. 1980) consists in finding the condition which guarantees the system has a
well-defined unique reduced form. In a general linear-in-means model, the coherency condi-
tion reduces to the invertibility of I − Γ, the matrix of coefficients of the endogenous vari-
ables. In a latent linear-in-means model with censored endogenous variables such as (8) the
coherency condition is more restrictive. Indeed, Amemyia (1974) has shown that every prin-
cipal minor of the matrix I −Γ must be positive. This coherency condition clearly implies the
existence of a unique social equilibrium at each round k of session g. In the empirical section,
this condition is verified for each specification of the structural model.
In a sense, the coherency problem precedes the identification problem. Indeed, the latter
refers to the uniqueness of the parameters of the structural model given the parameters of the
reduced form model. Identification therefore assumes the existence of a well-defined reduced
form. As discussed above, estimating social interactions models raises serious identification
problems. Results from Manski (1993) imply that it is impossible to identify the structural
parameters β, γ, δ and cg (g = 1, ..., G−1) when the model involves no censored endogenous
variables (Dg∗ki = Dgki for all i, k and g) and without a priori restrictions on the parameters of
δ. The reason is that the order condition for identification in a structural linear model is not
satisfied (Moffitt 2001). In our linear-in-means model, this condition requires that at least one
exogenous social interaction effect is excluded from the equations.
In theory, models with endogenous censored variables such as (8) may be easier to identify
than linear-in-means models. Due to the nonlinear relationship between observed reported
income and the corresponding latent variable, the model imposes a nonlinear relationship
between the individual behavior and the mean behavior of the reference group. As emphasized
by Brock and Durlauf (2001b), this is likely to solve the identification problem since nonlinear
models with self-consistent beliefs are most likely to be identified.10 From the econometric
point of view, this result is consistent with the idea that nonlinearity generally helps rather than
hampers identification. It is important to note however that identification hinges on knowing
the specific form of nonlinearity which, in our case, depends on the assumption of normality
of the error terms. In what follows we will not formally derive the conditions for identification
in our model. Instead we check the identification of the model by estimating its most general
version ( i.e., with no excluded exogenous social interaction effects) while ensuring that the
likelihood function converges to a unique maximum.
To derive the likelihood function of our model, let Zgik = (x
g
ik, D
g
−ik, x
g
−ik, 1) and α =
(β, γ, δ, cg)
′
so that from (7) we can write: Dg∗ik = Zgikα + ηgik. For any given round k in
10They derive conditions for identification in the case of a discrete-choice generalized logistic model of social
interactions and show that they are much less restrictive than for the linear-in-means model. However they do
not analyze the case of a mixed discrete-continuous tobit-type model such as the one used in this paper.
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session g define:
Rgk : the number of players who reported 0 < D
g
ik < 1,
Sgk : the number of players who reported D
g
ik = 0,
T gk : the number of players who reported , D
g
ik = 1.
with Rgk + S
g
k + T
g
k = N.
Divide the observations on all the rounds (for k = 1, ..., K and g = 1, ..., G) into seven
subsets:
S1 : R
g
k > 0, S
g
k = 0, T
g
k = 0.
S2 : R
g
k > 0, S
g
k > 0, T
g
k = 0.
S3 : R
g
k > 0, S
g
k = 0, T
g
k > 0.
S4 : R
g
k > 0, S
g
k > 0, T
g
k > 0.
S5 : R
g
k = 0, S
g
k > 0, T
g
k = 0.
S6 : R
g
k = 0, S
g
k = 0, T
g
k > 0.
S7 : R
g
k = 0, S
g
k > 0, T
g
k > 0.
Denoting the standard normal density and cumulative functions of ηgik by f(η
g
ik) and F (η
g
ik)
respectively, the likelihood function of the model (7) is given by:
L =
∏
S1
|BN |
[∏
N
f(Dgik − Zgikα)
]
× (9)
∏
S2
∏
X
g
k

BXg
k
f(Dgik − Zgikα)
∏
Y
g
k
F (−Zgikα)
×
∏
S3
∏
X
g
k
BXg
k
f(Dgik − Zgikα)
∏
Z
g
k
F (Zgikα− 1)
×
∏
S4
∏
X
g
k
BXg
k
f(Dgik − Zgikα)
∏
Y
g
k
F (−Zgikα)
∏
Z
g
k
F (Zgikα− 1)
×
∏
S5
∏
Y
g
k
F (−Zgikα)
×∏
S6
∏
Z
g
k
F (Zgikα− 1)
×
∏
S7
∏
Y
g
k
F (−Zgikα)
∏
Z
g
k
F (Zgikα− 1)
 ,
with
∣∣∣BRgk∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 − γ
N−1 · · · − γN−1
− γ
N−1 1 · · · − γN−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
− γ
N−1 − γN−1 · · · 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
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the determinant of the corresponding matrix [Rgk ×Rgk]. Maximizing the log of (9) with respect
to α and σ yields the full information maximum likelihood estimates of the model. Under
standard regularity assumptions, these estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient.
5 Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample. Most subjects are young and males are
more numerous than females. Both tax rates and audit probabilities display a large standard
deviation (see also Appendix B). This helps to identify their impact on tax compliance behav-
ior. Over 88% (53/60) of all rounds with feedback information on the tax compliance satisfy
the convergence criterion and therefore correspond to a social equilibrium. This leaves 795
observations on reported income in part II of the experiment (INFO treatment) out of 900 po-
tential observations. In the INFO treatment, 24.5% of these observations (195) are censored
at zero while 19% (151 observations) are censored at 100 for a total of 43.5% censored ob-
servations (346). The corresponding percentages in the NOINFO treatments are 18% (164
observations), 21% (189 observations) and 39% (353), respectively. Finally, the average re-
ported income in the INFO treatment (50.15) is about half the initial endowment and slightly
lower than the average reported income in the NOINFO treatment (53.92).
Figures 1 and 2 compare the average reported income in both treatments according to
individual tax rates and audit probabilities. Figure 1 shows that reported income increases
slightly with individual tax rates up to 60%. Figure 2 shows that the reported income increases
mostly as a function of individual audit probabilities. For a large majority of tax rates and audit
probabilities the reported income is lower in the NOINFO treatment. These unconditional
statistics need to be interpreted with care as they do not take into account other variables that
have a direct effect on reported income.
Table 2 reports detailed estimation results for various specifications of the model. As
mentioned earlier the econometric results focus exclusively on the INFO treatment. Columns
(1) and (2) provide results for the most general specification. They both correspond to a
full linear-in-means model (but with censored variables) since individual and corresponding
group mean variables are included as regressors. There are thus no exclusion restrictions
on exogenous interactions variables. Correlated effects are taken into account through 11
group dummies. The tax rate variable, ti, is entered nonlinearly since our theoretical model
predicts its impact on tax compliance can be decomposed into the sum of two opposite effects.
Only a gender dummy is included in this specification since no other individual variable was
significant at the 10 % level.
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Column (1) reports the estimation results for the general specification using a simple two-
limit tobit. It thus ignores the possible simultaneity bias. Since there are only 15 participants
in each session, this phenomenon may significantly bias the estimate of the endogenous social
effect. Results from column (1) show that, contrary to expectations, the parameter estimate
of D−i is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. It translates into a marginal
effect11 of -1.83. This is opposite to the social conformity effect because an increase in mean
group tax evasion drives individuals to be more compliant.
There are four reasons why such a result may obtain. First, tax evasion behavior may
induce a social anti-conformity rather than a social conformity effect. In other words, partic-
ipants may be inclined to deviate from the reference group’s behavior. Wenzel (2004) argues
that, at least in the field of tax evasion, social norms may induce deviation from mean group
response if the latter is inconsistent with individuals’ internal norms. Kooreman (2003) ob-
tains such an anti-conformity effect when studying student self-esteem: the lower the group
self-esteem, the higher the individual self-esteem. In our tax evasion experiment social anti-
conformity is unlikely, although it can not be completely ruled out. Second, since the tax
yields are used to finance scientific research, altruistic behavior may induce individuals to
contribute more when the others reduce their contribution. This explanation is also unlikely
to explain much of the tax evasion behavior of the participants. A third interpretation is that
individuals may reduce their tax evasion whenever the group evades more out of fear this may
trigger a higher audit rate in further rounds. This is unlikely because audit regimes are ex-
ogenous and this was made common knowledge in the instructions. Finally, the most likely
explanation is that the parameter estimate of D−i is biased because the simple two-limit to-
bit omits the potential simultaneity between individual and group responses. Recall that this
bias may arise from the fact that individual and group behavior feed on each another. Moffitt
(2001) and Krauth (2002) insist on the potential importance of this bias when the number of
individuals in the reference group is small. The results reported in columns (2)–(6) are based
on the likelihood function (9) and thus explicitly accounts for this. As it stands, the model in
column (2) imposes no exclusion restrictions. Identification of the parameter estimates thus
rests entirely on the response variables being censored and on the error terms assumed to be
normally distributed.
The first thing to notice is that the specifications of columns (2)–(6) all satisfy the co-
herency condition since the principal minors of the matrix I − Γ are positive in each case.
This implies that there is no multiple equilibria in our experiment. In column (2) the parame-
ter estimate of D−i, while still negative, is now much smaller (-0.046 rather than -2.936) and
is no longer statistically significant (t = 1.02). This result is robust to changes in model speci-
fication and indicates that there is no endogenous interactions effects in our experiment. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that when the mean behavior of the group does not
11We do not report marginal effects because they are intractable in specifications (2)–(6).
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affect the money payoffs of individuals, there is no endogenous social interactions associated
with tax evasion (Spicer and Hero 1985).However, one must be cautious before generalizing
this result to a real setting. Indeed, social interactions between players in a lab experiment are
likely to be less strong than those between individuals from a same reference group in the real
world.
The model can easily be modified to investigate the existence of exogenous interactions. It
suffices to include the tax rate and the audit probability both at the individual level, (ti,pi), and
in deviation from group means, (ti − t−i, pi − p−i), as in equation (4). Because the parameter
estimate of (t2−i) is not significant in specification (2) we have excluded it in specification (3)
to ease interpretation. The parameter estimate of ti − t−i is negative and significant at the
5% level. This lends support to the existence of a fairness effect in terms of horizontal equity
because individuals are inclined to report less when their fiscal treatment worsens relative to
that of the group. Spicer and Becker (1980) have also found that individuals who were told
their tax rates were above average reported relatively smaller amounts.12 On the other hand,
the parameter estimate of pi − p−i is not significantly different from zero thereby rejecting
fairness effects relative to the fraud preventing policy.
According to the parameter estimates of ti and t2i in column (3), Yitzhaki’s prediction is
verified at the mean tax rate (t¯ = 0.38). Indeed, a one percentage point increase in the individ-
ual tax rate increases desired reported income by as much as 0.622. The estimates also predict
that the positive impact occurs only at tax rates above 21%. Below that level the negative ef-
fect dominates and induces more tax evasion. As discussed above, both positive and negative
effects are consistent with our model when tax compliance yields a positive social marginal
utility. Interestingly, experimental results on the impact of tax rates on compliance are not
clear cut. Some studies have found that increased tax rates decrease compliance (Friedland et
al 1978; Collins and Plumlee 1991), while others have found the converse to hold (Beck et al.
1991; Alm et al. 1995).
In column (3) the parameter estimate of pi (= 1.605) is positive and significant at the 5%
level. This result is consistent with the Alingham-Sandmo proposition, according to which an
increase in the audit probability reduces tax evasion, but also with evidence based on survey
data (Friedland et al. 1978; Beck et al. 1991, Slemrod et al. 2001). As in many studies,
women are found to evade less than men (e.g., Spicer and Becker 1980, Baldry 1986). Ac-
cording to the parameter estimate of gender, ceteris paribus, females report on average 17.6
more units than males. As for correlated effects, only one group dummy (g9) is significant at
the 10 % level. To test for the overall significance of correlated effects we re-estimated the
model with no group dummies and report the results in columns (4). A likelihood ratio test
based on columns (3) and (4) cannot reject the null assumption that all group dummies are
12In an experiment similar to that of Spicer and Becker (1980), Webley et al. (1991) found no such fairness
effect.
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zero (χ2 = 13.5 ∼ χ2(11, .05) = 19.68). Our results are thus consistent with a fully random-
ized sample. However the mean group gender variable (sex−i) is now significant at the 5%
level so that gender composition is presumably correlated with group dummies.
Column (5) reports estimation results where both endogenous effects and correlated effects
are assumed away.13 Interestingly, the fairness effect on taxation is still significant at the 10%
level and its value is close to the one obtained when both endogenous effects and correlated
effects are included in the model (see column (3)). This result thus confirms the presence
of exogenous effects in our experiment. Finally, column (6) includes our inequality aversion
index (aversi) and its average group counterpart into the model. As expected, its parameter
estimate is positive and significant at the 5% level, thus indicating that those with a high
inequality aversion are likely to evade less, ceteris paribus. Including this variable, however,
has no impact on the other parameter estimates of the model.14
6 Summary
Research on tax evasion usually ignores “peer effects” or “social interactions effects”. This
omission is due to the fact that testing for such effects is notoriously difficult for two reasons.
First, outcomes data rarely reveal the reference group composition, whether it is the family,
the neighborhood, or work colleagues. Second, even when the group composition is known,
estimating interaction-based models raises severe identification problems.
The identification problem arises from the fact that interdependent behavior takes different
forms that are difficult to isolate. The propensity of an individual to evade may genuinely vary
according to the behavior of the group (endogenous interactions), but it may also vary with the
exogenous characteristics of the group members (exogenous interactions). Further, correlated
tax evasion outcomes need not arise from interdependent behavior alone. Indeed, members
of a given group may behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics
or face similar institutional environments (correlated effects). In a simple linear-in-means
regression-like model, equilibrium outcomes cannot distinguish endogenous effects from ex-
ogenous effects or correlated effects.
Even when an interactions-based model is identified, its estimation raises serious econo-
metric problems. In particular, the mean group decision, which appears as a regressor, is likely
to be endogenous for two reasons. First, since individuals self-select within groups, they are
likely to face common shocks and their observed and unobserved characteristics are likely to
13This restriction can not be tested on the basis a log-likelihood ratio test since the two-limit tobit is not nested
within our two-limit simultaneous tobit.
14We also tested for “dynamic social learning effects” by including dummy variables for each round. None
were ever significant at the 5% level.
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be highly correlated. Second, because individual and group behavior feed on one another, the
two variables are potentially simultaneously determined, at least when the groups are small.
In this paper we argue that laboratory experiments can be useful in solving these prob-
lems. Randomization of participants across groups limits correlated effects and sorting biases.
Further, reference groups are naturally defined as participants in each particular session. This
clearly helps identify the endogenous and exogenous interactions effects. The particular setup
of our experiment has an added benefit. Because it generates censored data, it naturally im-
plies a nonlinear relationship between individual and group responses, assuming normality
of the error terms. This nonlinearity allows identification of the model without the need to
impose any identifying restrictions.
In line with the recent empirical literature on social interactions, we find that the estimation
method is crucial in obtaining consistent estimates of interactions effects. Thus when we
ignore the simultaneity of individual and group responses, we find strong evidence of social
anti-conformity effects. These completely disappear once the simultaneity problem is taken
into account using an appropriate estimation method (two-limit simultaneous tobit).
We also find fairness effects in term of horizontal equity: for a same before-tax income,
those with higher than mean group tax rate evade more in order to restore equity. Perceived
unfair taxation may thus lead to increased tax evasion. At the policy level this means that a
taxation system that is more horizontally equitable is likely to improve tax compliance.
As noted by many (e.g., Manski 2000), experimental research also has its own limitations.
In our experiment the groups of taxpayers are formed artificially for the sake of the experiment.
Caution must thus be exercised when extrapolating our findings to the population of taxpayers.
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Appendix A: Instructions
You will be taking part in an experiment on decision-making under the aegis of both Universite´ Laval in Que´bec
and Universite´ Lumie`re Lyon 2. The experiment is designed so that your earnings will depend on your decisions.
The session consists of 10 rounds. The first five rounds involve a single-period, i.e. require a single decision.
The next five rounds include several periods, with each period requiring one decision. In each round you will
receive a score based on your decisions. The average score over entire session will determine your earnings.
Scores are converted into Euros at the following rate: 100 experimental currency units = 15 e. In addition, you
will receive a show-up fee of 1.5 e. Your earnings will be paid in cash at the end of the session in a separate
room to preserve the confidentiality of your earnings.
You will be part of a group of 15 participants from the same school. All your decisions are anonymous.
Talking is not allowed throughout the entire session. Any violation of this rule will result in being excluded from
the session and not receiving any payment. If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise
your hand; your question will be answered publicly.
ROUNDS 1 to 5
Each round consists of a single period. At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an en-
dowment of 100 experimental currency units . You are requested to give back a percentage of this endowment
according to a “rate of deduction”. There are 5 different rates and each of these is randomly assigned to 3
participants. The sum of the deductions from the group members serves to finance scientific projects.
The rate of reduction will be applied to the amount you report. You must use the scrollbar to report any
amount between 0 and 100 (100 corresponding to the endowment that you received).
This amount can be audited according to a certain audit probability and this audit may entail a penalty. There
are 5 different audit probabilities and each of these is randomly assigned to 3 participants. The consequences of
an audit are indicated below. There are 3 possible cases.
• If the amount you report is not audited, your deduction rate will apply to your reported amount. In this
case, no penalty applies. Your payoff is given by the following formula:
Payoff = Endowment - Deduction
Deduction = Deduction rate× Reported amount
• If the amount you report is audited and is equal to your endowment, your deduction rate applies to this
amount and consequently no penalty applies. Your payoff is given by the following formula:
Payoff = Endowment - Deduction
Deduction = Deduction rate× Endowment
• If the amount you report is audited and is less than your endowment, your deduction rate applies to your
endowment. In addition, you will be charged a penalty equal to your deduction rate times the non reported
fraction of your endowment. Your payoff is then equivalent to:
Payoff = Endowment - Deduction - Penalty
Deduction = Deduction rate× Endowment
Penalty = Deduction rate× Endowment - Reported amount
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What information do you receive at the beginning of each round?
At the beginning of each round, you are informed about the following:
• the 5 different deduction rates.
• your own deduction rate.
• the 5 different audit probabilities.
• your own audit probability.
On your computer screen you will find a scrollbar ranging from 0 to 100 which you must use to indicate
the amount you wish to report. As you move the scrollbar, you will see both your payoffs if audited or not. To
validate your decision, you must stop the scrollbar on the desired amount and then click the ”OK” button. Once
all the participants have clicked the ”OK” button, the next round will begin automatically.
You will be informed about the following at the end of the session only:
• the actual audit of your reported amounts and the number of the rounds in which an audit actually took
place.
• the payment of a penalty when applicable.
• your payoff.
What changes from one round to the next ?
Each round is independent from the previous ones. At the beginning of each new round, you will receive a
new endowment of 100 experimental currency units. Likewise, new deduction rates and audit probabilities will
be assigned randomly to participants.
[THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THE PARTICIPANTS ONLY AFTER ROUND 5
WAS COMPLETED]
ROUNDS 6 to 10
The session will continue in a moment, but with two changes however.
1. From now on, each round consists of several periods.
At the beginning of each new period of a round, you will receive an endowment of 100 experimental
currency units. Everyone keeps the same deduction rate and audit probability for all the periods of a
given round. When a new round begins, new deduction rates and audit probabilities will be assigned
randomly to all participants, including you.
2. As of the second period of a round, and for each successive periods, you will be given two additional
pieces of information:
• how many participants among the other 14 participants have reported less than their endowment in
the preceding period.
• the average amount reported by the other 14 participants in the preceding period.
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Appendix B: Values of tax rates and audit probabilities
The values of the tax rates and the audit probabilities used in each session are the following:
SESSIONS 1 TO 4
Distribution of the audit probabilities
Standard
Regime Individual Probability Mean Deviation
Low 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.37 0.18 12.2
Medium 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.25 10.3
High 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.33 6.2
Distribution of the tax rates
Standard
Regime Individual tax rates Mean Deviation
Low 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.70 0.26 23.5
Medium 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.40 12
High 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.50 7
SESSIONS 5 TO 8
Distribution of the audit probabilities
Standard
Regime Individual Probability Mean Deviation
Low 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.37 0.41 0.23 13.6
Medium 0.13 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.30 9.95
High 0.28 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.36 6.89
Distribution of the tax rates
Standard
Regime Individual tax rates Mean Deviation
Low 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.35 0.75 0.31 23.54
Medium 0.25 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.45 12.25
High 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.55 7.07
SESSIONS 9 TO 12
Distribution of the audit probabilities
Standard
Regime Individual Probability Mean Deviation
Low 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.29 0.33 0.15 13.22
Medium 0.03 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.21 10.29
High 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.29 7.13
Distribution of the tax rates
Standard
Regime Individual tax rates Mean Deviation
Low 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.65 0.24 21.54
Medium 0.15 0.30 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.35 12.25
High 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.45 7.07
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Stand. Min Max
Dev.
Amount reported in Part I 53.92 37.54 0 100
Amount reported in Part II 50.15 38.68 0 100
Age 23.61 5.94 17 50
Tax rate 0.38 0.16 0.05 0.75
Audit probability 0.25 0.11 0.02 0.47
Sex (Female=1) 0.40 0.49 0 1
Inequality aversion index 1.33 0.84 0 2
Number of observations
Groups 12
Rounds Part I + Part II 120
Rounds that converged in Part II 53
Participants per group 15
Observations on amount reported in Part I 900
Observations on amount reported in Part II∗ 795
- Censored at 0 in Part I (Part II) 164 (195)
- Censored at 100 in Part I (Part II) 189 (151)
- Not censored in Part I (Part II) 547 (449)
∗ Observations are limited to games that converged.
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Table 2
Estimation results of
the structural form model of tax compliance
(Dependent variable: Reported Individual divided by 100: Di/100)
(1) (2) (3)
two limit two limit two limit
tobit simultaneous simultaneous
Para. Std. Para. Std. Para. Std.
Error Error Error
Constant 0.380 5.032 -0.109 0.450 -0.061 0.212
ti -1.381 0.781 -1.874 0.714 -0.7745 0.577
t2i 1.774 0.985 2.323 0.901 1.838 0.824
pi 1.767 0.224 1.575 0.515 1.605 0.500
t−i 2.818 1.263 2.126 1.135
t2−i -2.522 1.918 -2.353 1.751
p−i 2.434 0.710 0.316 0.518
ti − t−i -0.692 0.356
pi − p−i 0.294 0.508
D−i -2.936 0.409 -0.046 0.045 -0.045 0.048
sexi(female = 1) 0.128 0.631 0.171 0.071 0.176 0.052
sex−i 0.358 8.782 0.006 0.725 0.082 0.346
g1 0.525 0.583 0.167 0.130 0.133 0.103
g2 0.235 1.824 0.086 0.193 0.067 0.106
g3 0.102 0.703 0.025 0.129 -0.020 0.109
g4 0.004 0.486 -0.037 0.134 -0.061 0.111
g5 0.113 3.690 0.021 0.340 -0.009 0.134
g6 -0.339 4.310 -0.139 0.388 -0.163 0.182
g7 -0.182 3.059 -0.101 0.292 -0.136 0.142
g8 0.149 1.815 0.062 0.215 0.012 0.122
g9 0.598 0.682 0.219 0.114 0.214 0.112
g10 0.348 1.210 0.109 0.151 0.117 0.105
g11 0.387 1.933 0.108 0.185 0.092 0.144
σ 0.627 0.023 0.581 0.022 0.582 0.022
Log Lik. -742.835 -720.829 -721.732
Number of observations: 795
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Table 2
Estimation results of
the structural form model of tax compliance
(continued)
(Dependent variable: Reported individual income divided by 100: Di/100)
(4) (5) (6)
two limit two limit two limit
simultaneous tobit tobit
tobit
Para. Std. Para. Std. Para. Std.
Error Error Error
Constant -0.071 0.212 0.090 0.219 0.076 0.263
ti -0.742 0.586 -0.351 0.706 -0.372 0.674
t2i 1.590 0.826 1.267 0.924 1.307 0.995
pi 1.368 0.520 1.256 0.513 1.256 0.539
ti − t−i -0.542 0.346 -0.654 0.395 -0.678 0.383
pi − p−i 0.523 0.524 0.556 0.523 0.570 0.551
D−i -0.028 0.054
Aversi 0.073 0.030
Avers−i -6.369 14.507
sexi(female = 1) 0.195 0.047 0.161 0.053 0.141 0.053
sex−i 0.344 0.149 0.485 0.155 0.511 0.152
σ 0.589 0.022 0.657 0.025 0.654 0.025
Log Lik. -728.490 -775.664 -772.401
Number of observations: 795
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